1650-1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern
Era
Volume 14

Article 7

2007

THE JUSTICE OF TOM JONES A Reevaluation of Henry Fielding's
Moral Theory
Matthew Binney

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/sixteenfifty
Part of the Aesthetics Commons

Recommended Citation
Binney, Matthew (2007) "THE JUSTICE OF TOM JONES A Reevaluation of Henry Fielding's Moral Theory,"
1650-1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era: Vol. 14, Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/sixteenfifty/vol14/iss1/7

THE JUSTICE OF
TOMJONES
A Reevaluation of
Henry Fielding's
Moral Theory
Matthew Binney

1

scholars would not categorize Henry Fielding's
writings or ideologies as postmodern. Indeed, as K
' ^G. Simpson writes in the introduction to Heni^
Fielding: Justice Observed, that "[cjertainly there are
dangers in trying to find in Fielding the forefather of the modern
divided self."^ However, Fielding's version of a whole, Cartesian Self
collects some interesting, inconstant characteristics, especially as the self
is viewed in relation to a community forming a system of justice.^ In
I

' K. G. Simpson, Hm^ Fielding: Justice Observed (London: Vision Press, 1985), 11.
^ Morris Golden recognizes this problematic view that Fielding has in his "Enclosed Self
section of Fielding's Moral Psychologji (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1966), 12.
"Though Fielding cannot help responding to the self-enclosed implication of Locke's
philosophy, he attaches himself, sometimes desperately, to good nature as the cure." Bernard
Harrison in Heny Fielding's Tom Jones.- The Novelist as Moral Philosopher (London: Sussex
University Press, 1975), 70, characterizes this pull of contradictions in Fielding as the debate
between the egoists (Hobbes and Mandeville) and the anti-egoists (Shaftesbury, and Locke
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Fielding's work, his system of justice is unstable: "[bjeneath that veneer
of benign assurance is there not a man who exemplifies" a "measure of
uncertainty?"^ I do not disagree with Simpson in stating that Fielding
provides the reader with a "measure of uncertainty" in relation to the
conveyance of justice. As a matter of fact, I intend to refine Simpson's
statement about Fielding's "measure of uncertainty" to exhibit exactly
how portions of Fielding's theory rest comfortably in postmodern
systems of limited justice. At the same time, I would argue that
Simpson is wrong in claiming that Fielding's assurance is "benign."
Fielding's assurance of proper judgment remains threateningly unstable
and indefinite. Indeed Fielding's theory of justice in TomJones reflects
one of the first attempts at creating a culturally applicable theory of
justice in which imprecise assurances of the self provide tools for
interpreting justice that is constantly threatened by shifting cultural
significations.
The beginning of the eighteenth century saw a shift toward
theories that determine individual action and self governance,'^
especially as aristocratic power totters with the burgeoning new, mer
cantile, bourgeois population. Before the rise of this bourgeois public
sphere, a monolithic, representative sphere [reprdsentative Offentlichkeit)
exists in which the aristocracy absolutely embodies the cultural and
social ideals of justice. That is, the self must act in accordance to
externally imposed rules; a universalist conception of justice.^ Private
individuals cannot step forward to make claims upon justice because
justice is imposed by representative people at a hierarchical zenith of
social and political action and thought. As this representative sphere
begins to coUapse, new notions of individual justice arise and develop
within many moral philosophies of the period; a particularist con
ception of justice. Thinkers begin to construct theories to account for
the individuals' larger role in determining moral action within society.
to a lesser degree).
^ Simpson, Henty Fielding, 11.
See J. B. Schneewind's The Invention of Autonomy: A Histoy of Modem Moral Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 5.
^ Schneewind states that "conceptions of morality as obedience came increasingly to be
contested by emerging conceptions of morality as self-governance. On the older conception,
morality is to be understood most deeply as one aspect of the obedience we owe to God," 4.
I defme this morality as obedience as universaUsm. I define morality as self-govemance as
particularism.
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instead of relying upon the fixed, absolute justice of the representative
aristocracy.
Fielding constructs a theory of justice situated between
universalism and particularism. Importantly, Fielding responds to the
methodologies posited by the previous thinkers and intimates a theory
that reflects characteristics in the postmodern debate upon justice.
Indeed, Fielding's theory intimates aspects of both Habermas's and
Michel Foucault's theories.'^ Fielding stresses the importance of
shifting norms and the importance of the role of reason in determining
justice, as Habermas does, while at the same time. Fielding emphasizes
the importance of questioning socially imposed influences upon
people's behavior—historicity—as Foucault does. As I discuss the
latent patterns of contemporary notions of justice in Fielding's moral
theory, I will argue that Fielding offers a theory with one of the initial
formulations of a cultural system of justice based upon the
interplay/questioning of cultural significations.
Pointedly, Fielding retains a representative or universalist aspect
to his theory, with a top-down imposition of a Christian conception of
goodness and reason; Fielding shows examples of goodness in Tom
Jones's charity to Mrs. MiHer's cousin: he "delivered her his Purse, in
which was the Sum of 501. [and] desired her to send as much of it as
she thought proper to these poor People."^ Coupled with this benevo
lent outlook is reason; Bernard Harrison notes that Fielding's moral
philosophy requires a mix of good heartedness with "sober reflection"
from his characters.® But, at the same time—and for the first
time—the author stresses conceptions of particularism, such as a

® This critical methodology situates literary works and concepts within historically informed
registers that depict "residual," "dominant," and "emergent"tendencies of intellectual thought
and development. See Raymond Williams' The Long "Revolution (New York: Coltrmbia
University Press, 1961); further, see Niklas Luhmann's notion of "social enlightenment,"
So^ologische Aufkldrung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970), which involves seeing that
operations are already going on when we make our observations. We must observe latency
to reveal the hidden reasons for action. When we do this, then we would develop an
enlightened social thinking that is able to "resist any seduction to attribute observations to
'persons.'" The residual thought is universalism; the dominant thought is a watered down
notion of universalism; and the emergent thought is particularism, which moves closer to
contemporary theories of morality.
' Henry Fielding, Tom Jones, ed. Sheridan Baker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 446.
® Bernard Harrison, Heniy Fielding's Tom Jones.- The Novelist as Moral Philosopher (London:
Sussex University Press, 1975), 106.
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bottom-up practice of varying viewpoints and juxtapositioning of
situations. This practice exemplifies itself in the townspeople's
interpretations of Jenny Jones's role in the birth of Tom. Indeed the
townspeople's positive and/or negative observations on Jenny's
behavior change with the shifting and alternating viewpoints that
become exposed in Jenny's relationship to Partridge, Allworfhy, and
Bridgett. Indeed Mrs. Deborah focuses on Jenny as the mother of litde
Tom, calling her an "audacious Strumpet,"' and as the townspeople
gather around Mrs. Deborah's inqioiry, theyimmediately pass judgment
upon Jenny because of her learning and new sets of clothes: "Not a
single Female was present, but found some Means of expressing her
Abhorrence of poor Jenny" (TJ, 36). Later AUworthy's punishment of
her becomes pubUcly apparent; consequently, the general public's
judgments change again, "there were many...who began to pity
[Jenny's] Condition; But when it was known in what manner Mr.
AUworthy had behaved, the Tide turned against her" (TJ, 41). These
judgments changed again when "a Whisper.. .went abroad, that
[AUworthy] himself was the Father of the foundling ChUd. This
Supposition so weU reconcUed his Conduct to the general Opinion,
that it met with universal Assent; and the Outcry against his Lenity
soon began to take another Turn, and was changed into an Invective
against his Cruelty to the poor Girl" (TJ, 41). In each case, the
townspeople's judgments ofJenny alter, as different social factors were
perceived acting on Jenny's character, mien, and behavior. That is,
with altered perspectives, people reevaluate their judgments of her
behavior; the townspeople's understanding changes, especiaUy
regarding what they thought they knew about her actions. As it
becomes aware of new social factors, the pubUc formulates new
viewpoints of knowledge, whether from the knowledge of her
education, how she dresses or how AUworthy treats her. In each case,
the people's knowledge of the actual Jenny changes in respect to the
social information that they receive about her.
Because Fielding's theory contains contrasting elements of a topdown imposition of benevolence and reason and a bottom-up practice
of varying viewpoints, it anticipates patterns within both Habermas and

' Fielding, Tom Jones, 35.
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Foucault. However, in a move that eases him closer toward a
Foucauldian conception of justice, Fielding emphasizes the importance
of using shifting norms within particular simations. This move, on
Fielding's part, represents a step closer to a theory of culmral practice.
This culmral practice of determining action later becomes one of the
most important distinctions between Habermas's and Foucault's
contemporary theories: should moral theories be based upon a
bounded rationality or a shifting, culmrally driven system of justice?^®

On the surface, Tom Jones appears to rely upon a traditional eighteenthcenmry system of moral justice where justice is meted out
providentially.^^ But, we can better understand the importance of
Fielding's notion of the self and its role in relation to justice in this
system through adopting Habermas's concept of representativeness in
The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: A.n Inquiry into a Category
of Bourgeois Society. During the Renaissance and High Middle Ages, the
court's role flourishes as a public embodiment of the society's implicit
hierarchy, where the word "public" symbolizes how the entire society
sees itself. The "public" for Habermas represents a sphere in which
public opinion is carried—a critical judge.^^ During the Middle Ages
the control of the public is dictated by the economic organization of
social labor by feudal lords. That is, the feudal lords control the land
and the economic products from that land. The serfs belong to the
land itself, and hence, they, in mrn, are subject to the lord's control of
their welfare. Tom Jones reflects this type of order through the power
of the landed gentry. Indeed, Partridge relies solely upon AUworthy in
order to subsist. When Partridge looses his position because of his
anomalous relation to Jenny, he still must rely on AUworthy, even if
AUworthy does not pubUcly support him. Support is conveyed to

See Michael Kelly's Critique and Power 'Recasting the FoucaultlHabermas Debate, ed. Michael
KeUy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
" See Martin Battestin's Phe Moral Basis of Fieldings Art (Middletown: Weslej^n University
Press, 1959).
'^Jiirgen Habermas, The StructuralTransformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into aCategory of
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge; MIT Press, 1989), 5.
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Partridge and his wife "by an unknown Hand, they imagined, and so,
I doubt not, will the reader, that Mr. Allworthy himself was their secret
Benefactor" (TJ, 69). Because the lords, like Allworthy, control the
wealth and welfare, the lords maintain absolute control over the lives
of their workers. As a result, private people cannot step forward into
a public sphere to make claims on law because they do not control the
means of production.^^ Simply, the private citizens cannot make public
judgement claims about their own welfare. Because of this lack of
control, the lord's decisions are said to reflect the will of the private
people—a public representativeness.
This representativeness embodied in the manorial lords, in mrn,
becomes a status attribute, in which the lord would represent the
constituents of his manor in the system of justice. Because of his
economic control and, subsequently, his control of public
representation, the manorial lord can present himself as an
embodiment of a higher power, which Allworthy does in his seat as the
magistrate of Paradise Hall. That is, the manorial lord stands at the top
of a socially and politically implicit hierarchy, where the concept of
representation in the lord's position professes to make the invisible
existence of a hierarchical power, visible through the public presence
of the lord himself.^'^ When the lord appears before pubHc gatherings
and assemblies, the consciousness of publicity becomes an important
tool in the representation of the social and judicial hierarchy. In order
to exercise control over the public consciousness, the lord s publicity,
involved in his representation, affixes itself to personal attributes such
a insignia, dress, demeanor and rhetoric—what is known as a strict
code of "noble" and, eventually, courtly conduct. As Habermas notes,
this system of representation crystallizes during the High Middle Ages
and Renaissance into a system of courtly virtues, a Christianized form
of the Aristotelian cardinal virtues.'^ In this system, the lord wields
absolute and unconditional discretionary power over private judgment
claims because he is the absolute representative of that society's justice.
Fielding provides us with examples of absolute representation in
Allworthy as he sentences Jenny, Partridge, Tom, and in Squire West-

" Habermas, Structural, 5-6.
" Habermas, Structural, 7.
Habermas, Structural, 8.
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em as he unfairly attempts to force his daughter to marry Blifil.
Through Fielding's parodic treatment of Western, we begin to see that
the aristocratic system of representation begins to come into question
and, even, collapse: how can one dispense effective justice when his
time is spent between drinking and hunting? Because of this
disintegration in representative justice, theories of individual justice
arise in order to give direction and management to individuals' moral
and judicial acts, since individuals cannot direct their lives from the
dictates of a representative publicness anymore. Fielding attempts to
offer a solution through the ostensibly unconditional, universalizable,
Shaftesburyian/Habermasian elements in his philosophy.
Fielding constmcts his theory around universalist or representative
aspects, which reflect a top-down movement of imposed systems that
ground action: i.e., benevolence and pmdence, a form of reasoning.
Bernard Flarrison describes these methods as reflned versions of
Shaftesburian benevolence or goodness and pmdence. Importantly,
Fielding implies that goodness must be a necessary aspect of moral
action, whereas Shaftesbury sees it as an innate trait—"enthusiasm"—
within humans themselves.^'' Indeed AUworthy himself proves very
benevolent in his actions to Tom, Mrs. Miller, and Mr. Partridge by
providing them with generous sums to Mve, but this fact still does not
prevent him from making mistakes in his moral judgment; indeed,
aided by Blifil's influence, AUworthy expels Tom from Paradise HaU
because he had determined that Tom "was an abandoned Rebrobate"
(IJ, 202). NaturaUy, since BUfU does not contain an innate sense of
goodness, he dismpts AUworthy's moral act. Apart from benevolence.
Fielding wants people to join this notion of goodness with a recogni
tion of pmdence. As shown in AUworthy's action. Fielding makes it
clear that benevolence alone cannot guide people to right conduct.
Indeed Tom's advantages, according to Fielding, surface through
Tom's recognition that although he often acted wrongly, he never did
so without feeUng the error of what he had done and suffering for it."
The commitment of the self s wiU to the good of others which is the

" I basically follow Bernard Harrison's thorough explication of Fielding's moral philosophy
from Hett^ FkMn^'s Tom Jones: The Novelist as Moral Philosopher (London: Sussex University
Press, 1975).
" Harrison, 91.
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primary ingredient of benevolence can thus be seen as a precondition
for entering moral experience.'^ Coupled with this Goodness of Heart
is the importance of prudence, which at one level is simply knowledge
of the world—knowledge of the chronic fallibility of human judgment
and the ease with which lack of caution, ignorance, or even adverse
circumstances alone, can betray a person into ruin." AUworthy
attempts to allow for this knowledge of the world in his analysis of
Tom's behavior in that same situation through asking Thwackum's
opinion: "where is Thwackum?.. .1 will examine all the Evidence of this
Matter" (TJ, 201). Clearly AUworthy seeks to be prudent by acquiring
knowledge of the world before he passes judgment upon Tom—this,
of course, faUs as weU. In his reUance upon benevolence and prudence.
Fielding stresses that people need to carry these traits around with
them as they experience aU situations. This emphasis leans toward
making benevolence and prudence universalizable, if not that, at least,
generalizable.
As we wUl see, Fielding's notion of prudence and benevolence
prefigures the reUance upon notions of soUdarity and the formulation
of reasoned desires in Habermas's theory. In his discourse ethics,
Habermas attempts to create an ideal speech situation in which aU
people within a given society would come together to make decisions
which hold universal significance for aU who participate. In this ideal
sphere of discourse, Habermas claims that in order for people to
beUeve that a position—^poUtical, moral, or ethical—^is right, they must
believe that they have good reasons to hold that stance. Factors
contributing to good reasons include basing arguments on reason,
distancing oneself from personal views, possessing goodwUl toward the
other participants, and maintaining a constraint-free environment. In
such a situation, people would create impartial judgments that would
gain universal agreement in an ideal communication community.
This discourse ethic is founded upon traditionally Western and
Enlightenment notions of universalization and intersubjectivity. The
principle of universalization explains what people's everyday intuition
would outline for them as a strategy for solving moral conflicts: the
principles of argument and impartiality. These principles make possible

Harrison, 99.
" Harrison, 107.
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a formal framework for different communities' customs to join in acts
of solidarity because everyone will share a discourse driven by reason
and impartiality. Habermas, then, argues that the principle of
universalization with its postulates of freedom should be applicable to
the critical examination of practical, everyday norms. Every valid norm
must fulfill the condition that "[a]U affected can accept the
consequences and the side effects, [the norms] general observance can
be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests."^"
Before people can suggest "norms," they must be norms that reflect
the sentiments of those participating in Habermas's discourse ethics,
i.e., argument, impartiaUty, and freedom. In essence, people must
externalize their desires and intentions to the common good or an
overriding concept of human welfare.
Habermas introduces solidarity or intersubjectivity as a
methodology in making the connection between the norms that an
individual might suggest and the norms the Other would accept.
Habermas maintains that in his notion of universalization, everyone
must participate—^i.e., solidarity; "only an intersubjective process of
understanding can produce an agreement that is reflexive."^^ Reflexivity and intersubjectivity here reflect the same principle because they
both relate to how the self and the Other recognize each other's desires
and intentions. When one has a strong foundation of reason and
freedom in ethical discourse then one can overcome otherness through
forming a synthesis with the Other, where a binding force occurs of
"intersubjective understanding and reciprocal recognition."^^ As
Habermas notes, by forming a strong system of reason, maintaining
impartiality, reflecting the three principles of freedom,and participating
in an intersubjective process of understanding, then allin a community
wiU not be limiting each other, but expressing and actualizing every
one's freedoms and desires. Solidarity comes about through the strict
actualization of theindividual's reasoned desires to the reasoned desires
of the entire community. Whenever people use this method, they wiU

20

'Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness andCommunicative Action, trans. ChristianLenhardt and
Shierry Weber Nichoisen (Cambridge; MIT Press, 1992), 65.
Habermas, Moral, 77.
^ Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve lectures, trans. Frederick
Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 324.
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always agree upon the moral, social, or political principles that they
found. That is, they wiU all possess and agree upon impartial, umversalizing principles that they can use to guide their lives and, ultimately,
flourish. This is the point at which Habermas insists upon the
unconditionality of these claims; through his notion of intersubjectivity,
the individual and the other will always agree upon norms that they all
can accept to use in an ideal community of communication.
Importantly for Habermas and for Fielding, this notion of
universalization runsinto hard criticism. One primaryconcern surfaces
in the necessarily finite nature of any public sphere, and the fact that
the participants are humans, limited in processing power and
knowledge; that is, they are limited in applying the unconditional norms
of reason and impartiality, as AUworthy is Umited in pmdence in his
judgment upon Tom's behaviorTheories such as Herbert Simon's
models of bounded rationality highlight the limited ability of human
beings when faced with questions such as achieving a successful
outcome when there are an unknown number of possible results.
Indeed problems cannot be solved through the introduction of
concepts such as a satisfying strategy which seeks to satisfy some preset
goal because, simply, people have limited attention which restJts in
both political fad^shness and one-issue politics.^'^ Here Habermas's
theory proves problematic because of its assumed distance from
everyday cultural interaction and influence; it fails to account for the
limits of human capabilities, especially when having to perceive these
through a restrictive, ideologically imposed satisfying strategy. Fielding
experiences these same problems because he intends for his notions of
prudence and benevolence to be applied universally in situations as a
means to form right behavior. As noted, BlifU can easily manipulate
these norms to distort Tom's behavior before AUworthy. Hence, to

^ Since K. G. Simpson's (ed.) Heniy Fielding:Justice Observed
Barnes & Noble,1985),
many critics have focused on the real-world aspects of Fielding's justice (being a magistrate).
Raymond Stephanson's article follows in this vein and provides a good account of
epistemological limitations upon judgment and justice in "Fielding's 'Courts'; The Legal
Paradigm in Tom Jones," EngUsh Studies in Canada 14 (1988). Carl R. Kropf does this as well in
"Judgment and Character, Evidence and the Law in TowJones," Studies in the Novell! (1989).
Each of these articles reinforces the problems in formulating a clear and persuasive judgment
from bounded rationality.
^ Herbert A. Simon, Models of Bounded Bationality, Volume 3: Empiricallj Grounded Economic
Beason (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 291—98.
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avoid these problems Fielding creates a portion of his moral
philosophy that serves as a check and balance to this universalizable
methodology of moral action.
In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of bounded reason that Field
ing's theory dangerously slips into with its stress upon benevolence and
pmdence, which emulate a top-down imposition of methodological
action. Fielding incorporates a bottom-up practice of questioning
imposed norms. Indeed Fielding attempts to avoid the problems of
bounded rationality through his notion of varying viewpoints and
ironic juxtapositioning. Again, in Fielding's moral philosophy. Hamson argues that Fielding's novel embodies the notion that "certain
kinds of knowledge of man's inwardness, of what he is, are easier to
convey through ironic juxtaposition of viewpoints than through the
creation of an illusion of direct knowledge of a character's stream of
consciousness."^^ Here Harrison delivers a clear subject versus object
delineation. For Fielding, moral action occurs in the interplay of
varying viewpoints within the actions and the words of the characters,
and the participant must step back to view these—^in a kind of freezeframe—^in order to view the contextual significance of these actions
and words within an objective world; otherwise, the definitions or
meanings of these actions can assume a rigid, bounded construct:
For Fielding, the contrast between a man's real nature and
the surface he presents to the world cannot be identified
either with the contrast between inner consciousness and
behavior or with the contrast between what he says and what
he does....Rather it is the contrast between what an
interlocutor, looking at what a character says and does from
a particular viewpoint, might make of him, and what a
second interlocutor or a spectator, able to survey both from
a second viewpoint, might make of the commerce between
them. Fielding's concept of character, in short, is founded in
the notion of the coherence of a man's speech and action
when seen from different viewpoints.

Harrison, 44.
Harrison, 44—45.
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Clearly the reader must actively examine the positionings of characters
within the text as an "interlocutor" to inspect the action and to
determine which practice constitutes the proper moral action through
the interplay of ironic viewpoints. Again, returning to AUworthy, he
fails to possess this ironic interaction of viewpoints in his dismissal of
Tom; instead, he possesses only one perception, Blifil's biased analysis
and interpretation of Tom's behavior. Bliffl states:
for in the very Day of your utmost Danger, when myself and
aU the Family were in Tears, he filled the House with Riot
and Debauchery. He drank and sung and roared; and when
I gave him a gende Hint of the Indecency of his Actions, he
fell into a violent Passion, swore many Oaths, called me
Rascal, and stmck me. {TJ, 201)
In this example, no particular viewpoint reveals ever3rthing about
reality. Indeed Tom was carousing and celebrating because he was
happy that AUworthy would survive; however, BUfU does not represent
this version of the story to AUworthy. Hence, only certain types of self
understanding can exist, which can only be acquired by looking at
situations from two or more points of view at once.^^ The kind of
information that the reader acquires in this way can only be acquired
if the readers are wUUng to think about what they read through
projecting themselves imaginatively into several viewpoints, rather than
to lapse into passivityin the assurance that they are being conducted by
an infaUible guide.^® In contrast, AUworthy faUs to place himself within
varying viewpoints by relying primarily upon BUfU's account of Tom's
behavior. As a result, 7\Uworthy, as a judge and magistrate, faUs
because he lapses into passivity and complacency, assuming that his
innate and generaUzable sense of goodness and reason is properly
guiding him. Through AUworthy's failure, Fielding exposes the neces
sity of readers projecting themselves into varying situations which, in

^ Samuel Longmire provides a good explanation of this lack of ironic juxtapositioning in
AUworthy's examinmg of information against Tom Jones in "AUworthy and Barrow: The
Standards for Good Judgment," Texas StuiUes inUterature and hanguage (1972), 632.
^ Harrison, 50.
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turn, allows them to observe the ironic significances in meanings as
they juxtapose these meanings.
Here Fielding's theory anticipates latent patterns of Foucault's
notion of historicity, critique, and resistance. Foucault argues that
society can be seen as a disciplining mechanism, similar to Jeremy
Bentham's prison, the Panopticon, in which a supervisor stands hidden
in a center tower while the prisoners stand in open, observable cells.
This panoptic "mechanism" or gaze penetrates aU of society. In such
a community where the gaze regulates actions, "compact disciplines are
broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be
transferred and adapted."^® The "methods of control" become
"flexible" because the function of the gaze serves as an automatic
correcting devise within society. That is, through the gaze, individuals
become aware of their position and role within society; they become
aware of the demands of the community, as the prisoner is aware of the
supervisor's gaze, and they alter their behavior accordingly. This
awareness reflects the same role of the readers in Tom Jones, in which
they must project themselves imaginatively into several viewpoints, as
Foucault's prisoner must see himself in the eyes of the supervisor,
rather than to lapse into a passive assurance that an infallible guide
leads him.^'' At the same time, the others within society become aware
of individual's demands and desires through gazing back upon the
subject, as the supervisor can determine the immediate needs of the
prisoner in his cell.
Inherent in this system lies the self-correcting device between the
self and the Other; Foucault's gaze serves as a method for the indivi
dual to externalize and realize his or her desires in the outside world,
and this occurs over time, a historicity. Through recognizing the
proliferation of power between each other, individuals can gauge and

^ Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Vintage, 1977), 211.
In John Bender's Imagining the Penitentiaiy: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in EighteenthCentury England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 178 and 192, the author argues
that the narrator himself becomes a character through his "removal to a sphere of absolute
control" which establishes "a mode of omniscience congenial to assiirulation within the
convention of transparency. In essence, the narrator himself has become another member
in the juxtapositioning of various viewpoints. He is another character through which the
reader can use to place himself as he attempts to account for the behavior between the
characters and the author's representation of those characters.
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readjust their understandings of each other through moments of time.
Therein lies the importance of Foucault's concept of critique—a
consistent questioning into the nature of these power connections
between the different members of a community, which are in constant
flux and alteration, as different power relations constantly develop,
swell, and, then, dissipate cyclically in society. Similarly, Fielding's
theory reflects this process through the projection of the readers into
varying situations that allow them to observe the ironic significances in
meanings as they juxtapose these meanings at the same time. The
readers' interpretation of moral action relies upon conditions
determined by their cultural influence. People must not attempt to
formulate universal norms, as Habermas propounds, but they must
seek to expose shifting norms that function within a set moment in
time and culture in order to avoid the lapses into passivity and
complacency that we have already observed in AUworthy's judgment
of Tom.
By focusing on norms at specific cultural and historical moments.
Fielding and, later, Foucault want to use resistance or critique to
question from where "the most immediate, the most local power rela
tions" emanate, and to question how power relations "make possi
ble.. .these kinds of discourses, and conversely, how.. .these discourses
[are] used to support power relations."^^ That is, Foucault wants to use
the intersubjectivity of the gaze to question the proliferation of power
"discourses" in society. The gaze itself becomes a method by which
the individual and the other can partake in reflexivity—a going-backand-forth—determining the needs, desires, and demands of each other.
Fielding's readers partake in this intersubjective process as well in their
positionings within various moral simations. Fielding accomplishes
this intersubjective positioning splendidly in Book XIII, chapter XI,
when Tom sees Sophia—^unforeseen by both of them—^in Lady
BeUaston's drawing room. At this moment, especially when Lady
Bellaston enters the room, the reader becomes distinctly aware of the
various conflicting moral strands, as Sophia is aware of Tom's infidelity
at Upton; "Could I have expected...such Treatment from you?"
Simultaneously, Tom believes that she might know about his new

Michel Foucault, TheHisto^ of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New
York: Vintage, 1978), 97.
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liaison with Lady Bellaston: "Lady Bellaston, and the ignotninious
circumstance of having been kept, rose again in his Mind" (TJ, 473).
Of course, when Lady Bellaston enters the room, Sophia hides the fact
that she knows Tom, and Tom and Bellaston both hide the truth of
their ongoing affair. These various juxtaposing situations interact with
each other, exposing the desires and demands that each person wishes
to puU from the situation, whether they reflect Sophia's determination
in provingTom's love and fidelity, BeUaston's retention of her beau, or
Tom's playing off of both demands and finding a position to maneuver
in the middle. This refiexivity of the reader and the simation can be
positive or negative as subjects change their practices to conform to the
other, and vice versa. Paramount in Fielding's methodology is the
perception of the individual in determining action. Through the
various viewpoints, the readers can determine a localized
justice—^localized because the justice is determined by the individual's
perception of juxtaposed experiences. As we hash out similarities and
differences to latent patterns in Habermas's and Foucault's theories of
justice, we can see that Fielding's thought leans slightly towards one of
these thinkers: Foucault. Fielding's theory represents one of the initial
attempts at creating a methodology that appUes itself to shifting,
ongoing cultural significations of moral practice.
In Tom Jones, Fielding adopts more of a shifting-perspectives,
particularist approach to combat the limitations of universalizing
principles of Christian benevolence and prudence. The writer does not
adopt a strict, representative set of rules to follow. Fielding, on the
other hand, emphasizes the reliance upon human nature and localized
reason within the individual. Tom Jones exposes this reliance upon the
individual's ability to make decisions when he states resoundingly in
prison that "I have undone myself (TJ, 582). Indeed Tom places aU
of the responsibility of moral action upon himself, not upon complying
with an absolute, overarching religious doctrine.After he acknowledges
his own responsibility for his actions, Tom's plight immediately begins
to change. Mrs. Miller tells AUworthy about Tom's benevolence, and
Blifil's treachery is exposed. Tom begins to be rewarded for his
recognition of his own responsibility. Indeed, by the end of the novel.
Fielding rewards Tom with Sophia, an estate, and a potential seat in
Parliament. However, at the same time. Fielding never mentions any
punishments that occur to the arguably less-than-virtuous characters
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such as Northerton and Lady Bellaston: Northetton for attempting to
rape Jenny Jones and Lady Bellaston for attempting to rape Sophia. In
these instances. Fielding exhibits that through following benevolence
and pmdence, people will be rewarded with virme, but, at the same
time. Fielding wants to emphasize the existence of culmral variables
that are not punished like Lady Bellaston and Mr. Northerton. Lady
Bellaston and Mr. Northerton fail to fall under the universal aspect of
Fielding's moral philosophy. Fielding's theory makes this arrangement
because he decides to construct his moral philosophy in a way that
takes into account shifting culmral variables, not a wholly universalizing
principle like Habermas's proceduralist, and arguably, top-down,
ideology.
Fielding sees the necessity to create a moral theory that takes into
account the random flucmations of everyday Ufe, and he does this
through his varying viewpoints that the reader perceives in Tom Jones.
For example. Fielding states that Lady Bellaston acts with "ill Purpose"
in attempting to undo Sophia by having Lord Fellamar rape her: "Lady
Bellaston [had] taken Care to remove aU Ears" (TJ, 516). But, later, the
reader sees Lady Bellaston again: "she behaved toJones as to a perfect
Stranger, and with great Civility, wished him Joy on his Marriage" (JJ,
640). Clearly Bellaston has not been punished for her "iU" designs; she
stands, until the end, as a possible means of action—for the readers or
characters to foUow or to act against. In this instance. Fielding requires
the readers to determine for themselves how they need to act in a
world populated by Bellastons. Because she is not punished. Fielding
disposes the readers to read the text in a specific manner, to question
relationships in individualistic and empirical terms. In short, Fielding's
varying viewpoints provide a basis for the generation of culmral
practices. In other words, the readers of Fielding's text encounter what
they know empirically about Bellaston—that she is part of the
aristocracy, and that she acts "ill" in different ways—and this empirical
information comes into contact with her avoidance of socially
constmcted mles of behavior. The readers' and characters' actions,
then, are produced by a less-than-conscious process of adjustment of
the practices of individuals to the external constraints of the social
world. That is, the readers have to act in such a way that their society
wiU permit them because Lady Bellaston is a member of the aristocracy
and cannot be easily arrested. At the same time, they must determine
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moral action for themselves in a society circumscribed by opposing
moral actions, e.g., BeUaston and Northerton. Hence, the emphasis
faUs upon individual action in determining how to deal with Lady
BeUaston at the end of the novel—^people must use a reciprocal
juxtapositioning of themselves to the external environment to
determine how to act moraUy. This emphasis shows exactly where
Fielding's Foucauldian elements work, where the readers must move
through a conscious process of adjustment to right themselves with the
constraints of the social world, the varying viewpoints and
juxtapositionings. Individuals do not right themselves with universali2able norms imposed upon discourse; otherwise, if Fielding's theory of
moral action proves universaUzable, BeUaston and Northerton would
have to experience some form of punishment because social
constraints on behavior would require that—for the sake of "order."
For Fielding, the individuals unconsciously move through shifting
cultural significances, hoping to arrive at a state where some virmes are
rewarded. Indeed people must correct/adjust their action against social
variables, Uke BeUaston, to arrive eventuaUy at a point where their
moral action and decisions yield positive rewards.
In practicing Fielding's theory, the reader participates in a culmral
determination of action. Since an individual acts in a sociaUy
constmcted form of moraUty, formed upon the necessity to fashion a
locaUzed, individual system of behavior, then the person must
necessarUy act within culturaUy determined registers. Hence, Fielding's
theory does reflect elements of top-down appUcation of imposed
goodness and reason—^which echoes, as weU, a continuation of the use
of representative justice; he acknowledges this, and uses his many
points of view as a means for one to practice a type of Foucauldian
resistance that is ultimately grounded upon and shifts between
culturaUy influenced norms and criterion for thought. Consequently,
prudence and benevolence become more of a tool or filter through
which Fielding's moral action wiU be conveyed or practiced, instead of
an unconditionally imposed, representative methodology.
Unfortunately, this moral theory of cultural practice potentiaUy leads
to problems because individuals cannot determine how they should act
pmdentiaUy in a bounded system of rationaUty as they are trapped
within cultural significations of thought. In any case. Fielding offers a
mdimentary form of creating a moral theory of justice/moraUty based
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upon cultxiral variations, which is developed at more length within later,
contemporary theorists. Consequentiy, perhaps we should ack
nowledge that Fielding has more of a hand in the development of
modern conceptions of the self and morality than previously discussed.

